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T
he Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has
been implementing monetary policy by setting a
target for the federal funds rate since about 1990.
Implementing monetary policy by setting a target for the
funds rate enabled policymakers and monetary policy
analysts to characterize changes in the stance of monetary
policy by simply observing whether the target was increased
or decreased. However, with the federal funds rate target
currently between zero and 25 basis points, the FOMC
can no longer ease policy by reducing the target rate given
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.1 Instead,
the Federal Reserve has attempted to ease policy by engag-
ing in quantitative easing (QE): the large-scale purchase of
government and other securities with the primary intent
of reducing longer-term interest rates. 
Given the difficulty of characterizing monetary policy
using QE, it is natural to want to equate a given quantity
of assets purchased with a given reduction in the federal
funds rate target in an environment when the FOMC
could reduce the target. Indeed, in a Congressional hear-
ing on February 9, 2011, Representa  tive Tim Huelskamp
questioned how the Fed “picked $600 billion” when the
FOMC decided on a second round of QE (called QE2) at
its November 2010 meeting. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke
responded, “We asked the hypothetical question, if we
could lower the federal funds rate, how far—how much
would we lower it?” He noted that “a powerful monetary
policy action in normal times would be about a 75 basis
point cut in the federal funds rate. We estimate that the
impact on the whole structure of interest rates from $600
billion is roughly equivalent to a 75 basis point cut.”2 This
synopsis focuses on an important reason to be skeptical of
such equivalency estimates.
Chung et al.’s article is used to illustrate how analysts
estimate the funds rate target change equivalency of a given
QE action. Chung et al. estimate that the FOMC’s 2009
QE actions resulted in about a 50-basis-point reduction
in the 10-year Treasury yield, which they then estimate is
equivalent to about a 200-basis-point cut in the federal funds
rate.3 The latter estimate, which is similar to Chairman
Bernanke’s, is based on a regression of quarterly changes
in the 10-year Treasury yield on quarterly changes in the
funds rate over the 1987-2007 period. They note that their
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The average relationship between
changes in the 10-year Treasury yield
and changes in the funds rate 
over the 1987-2007 sample period 
is not indicative of the relationship
between changes in the funds rate and
changes in the 10-year Treasury yield
that existed for more than a decade
prior to the financial crisis.
Regression Estimates of the Change in the 10-Year Treasury Yield on the Change in the Federal Funds Rate
1987:Q1–2007:Q4 1995:Q1–2007:Q4 2000:Q1–2007:Q4
Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value
Intercept –0.030 0.483 –0.067 0.187 –0.058 0.342
Slope 0.295 0.002 0.103 0.385 0.104 0.370
– R
2 0.105 0.000 0.000
Standard error 0.384 0.363 0.328estimate of the coefficient on the funds rate of “about 0.25”
implies “that a 100 basis point reduction in short-term
rates is typically associated with a 25 basis point decline in
long-term yields” and concluded that the “50 basis point
drop in bond yields through conventional means rather
than asset purchases should ordinarily require something
like a 200 basis point cut in the federal funds rate”4 (empha -
sis added).
However, these authors and others have failed to notice
that the relationship between changes in 10-year Treasury
yields and changes in the funds rate (on which their esti-
mate rests) changed dramatically beginning in the late 1980s
and essentially vanished by the mid-1990s. Consequently,
the average relationship between changes in the 10-year
Treasury yield and changes in the funds rate over the
1987-2007 sample period is not indicative of the relation-
ship between changes in the funds rate and changes in the
10-year Treasury yield that existed for more than a decade
prior to the financial crisis.
The table illustrates the marked change in the relation-
ship. The table reports the estimates of the intercept on
slope coefficients and corresponding significance levels 
(p-values), along with estimates of – R2 and the standard
error, from a simple regression of the change in the 10-
year Treasury yield on the change in the funds rate using
quarterly averages of daily figures over three sample periods:
1987:Q1–2007:Q4, 1995:Q1–2007:Q4, and 2000:Q1–
2007:Q4. The estimates over the full sample period confirm
the conclusion by Chung et al. that a 200-basis-point reduc-
tion in the federal funds rate target would correspond to
about a 50-basis-point reduction in long-term yields. The
estimate of the slope coefficient over the 1995:Q1–2007:Q4
and 2000:Q1–2007:Q4 periods is about a third of that over
the entire sample. Moreover, the estimates are insignificantly
different from zero, and the estimate of – R2, which was only
about 10 percent over the entire sample period, declines to
zero over the latter sample periods. Hence, there has been
no statistically significant relationship between quarterly
changes in the funds rate and quarterly changes in the 10-
year Treasury yield since the mid-1990s.5 This suggests that,
at best, it is misleading to use estimates of the relationship
between these rates obtained with data before the mid-
1990s to equate a given level of asset purchases by the
Fed with a specific change in the FOMC’s funds rate target.
Such estimates are not valid for translating QE actions into
funds rate target changes. Consequently, they provide no
guidance for the appropriate amount of QE actions the
FOMC should undertake. ■
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